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TIME FOR JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
ESA RECOVERY PLANS? . . . “WHEN 
[SQUIRRELS] FLY” 
Michael Deiulis* 
Abstract: In August 2008, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service published a 
final rule in the Federal Register officially removing the West Virginia 
northern flying squirrel from the List of Threatened and Endangered 
Wildlife, approximately twenty-three years after it was originally listed. 
The flying squirrel’s delisting proved quite controversial and many envi-
ronmentalists challenged the agency’s decision for violating of the En-
dangered Species Act. The D.C. Circuit, in Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 
nevertheless upheld the FWS’s delisting decision, finding that ESA recov-
ery plans merely provide non-binding guidance. This Comment argues 
that although the D.C. Circuit decided the case correctly on the basis of 
proper statutory interpretation and adherence to common law prece-
dent, the practical implications of this decision create significant cause for 
concern. Congress should therefore amend the ESA to impart legal en-
forceability on recovery plans if it wishes provide endangered species with 
a heightened degree of protection. 
Introduction 
 The environmental community can breathe a collective sigh of 
relief knowing that one of our country’s oldest native species, dating as 
far back as the ice ages, has narrowly avoided suffering the same peril-
ous fate as the mastodons of eras past—at least for now.1 The imposi-
tion of federal protections, combined with an innate resiliency, has fa-
cilitated the West Virginia northern flying squirrel’s recovery from the 
brink of certain extinction.2 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many out-
side the environmental community have ever heard of, let alone seen, 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 13, 16–17, Friends of Blackwa-
ter v. Salazar, 772 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.DC. 2011) (No. 1:09-cv-02122); U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv., West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel: Glaucomys Sabrinus Fuscus 1 2006, 
available at http://www.fws.gov/northeast/pdf/flyingsq.pdf. 
2 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 1. But see Complaint, supra note 1. 
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these peculiar critters in the flesh—and for good reason.3 The West 
Virginia northern flying squirrel is a nocturnal rodent that lives in 
small, secluded clusters at high altitudes within the densely forested 
habitats of the central Appalachian Mountains.4 Unsurprisingly, these 
squirrels are not frequently spotted soaring across the West Virginia sky, 
not only because of their rarity, secretive disposition, and isolated habi-
tat—but perhaps more logically, because they are actually flightless.5 
The flying squirrel weighs less than five ounces, has a broad, flat tail, 
and can “pull the loose folds of skin (patagia) between [its] fore and 
hind legs taut,” creating a parachute-like effect that enables it to glide 
from limb to limb.6 
 The advent of widespread industrial logging in the 1880s, contrib-
uted in large part to the decimation of the flying squirrel’s natural 
habitat and pushed the species, whose expected lifespan is only three to 
four years, to the brink of extinction.7 It is within this context that the 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) made the initial decision to place 
the West Virginia northern flying squirrel on the endangered species 
list in 1985.8 Some twenty years later, the FWS divisively decided to de-
list the species pursuant to a review of data gathered from a compre-
hensive scientific investigation.9 Many environmental organizations 
cried foul in the immediate aftermath of this decision and eventually 
responded by filing suit to challenge the FWS’s delisting.10 What en-
                                                                                                                      
3 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., Appalachian Northern Flying Squirrels Recovery 
Plan 11 (1990), available at http://www.fws.gov/ecos/ajax/docs/recovery_plans/1990/9009 
24c.pdf [hereinafter Recovery Plan]. 
4 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 1. 
5 Recovery Plan, supra note 3; News Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Squirrel Ready 
to Fly Solo: Endangered Species’ Future Looks Bright ( June 2, 2006), available at http:// 
www.greenenvironmentnews.com/Environment/Wildlife/Squirrel+ready+to+fly+solo%3 
A+Endangered+species%27+future+looks+bright. 
6 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 1. 
7 See Recovery Plan supra note 3, at 12–13; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 1. 
8 Determination of Endangered Status for Two Kinds of Northern Flying Squirrel, 60 
Fed. Reg. 26,999, 26,999 ( July 1, 1985) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
9 Proposed Rule to Remove the Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the Federal 
List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,924, 75,924 (Dec. 19, 2006) 
(codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); see Final Rule Removing the Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel 
from the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,226, 50,227 
(Aug. 26, 2008) (codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). During the 120-day comment period the FWS 
received a total of 4808 public comments, the majority of which opposed the proposed 
delisting. Id. The “Virginia northern flying squirrel (Glaucomys sabrinus fuscus), now 
more commonly known as the West Virginia northern flying squirrel.” Id. 
10 Final Rule Removing the Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the Federal List of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 73 Fed. Reg. at 50,5227; see Friends of Blackwater v. 
Salazar, 691 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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sued was a legal battle involving an exhaustive exercise in statutory in-
terpretation, which called into question the meaning of certain provi-
sions of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).11 
 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s affirmation 
in 2012 of the FWS’s decision to delist the West Virginia northern flying 
squirrel in Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar demonstrates how proper 
statutory construction does not always lead to desirable outcomes.12 
This Comment argues that although the D.C. Circuit properly inter-
preted common law precedent and the ESA’s plain meaning to decide 
the case, the resultant implications create cause for concern.13 As a 
consequence, “[w]hether the balance between enforceable procedural 
duties to prepare recovery plans and unenforceable recovery plan re-
quirements is adequate to conserve endangered species remains an 
open question.”14 Accordingly, this Comment suggests that an amend-
ment is necessary if the legislature intended—contrary to what it 
drafted—for recovery plans to be legally binding.15 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In 1985, scientists studying the West Virginia northern flying squir-
rel became increasingly alarmed when tracking efforts yielded only ten 
specimens in the counties of Randolph and Pocahontas, West Virginia, 
and two specimens in Highland County, Virginia.16 Although the spe-
cies’ reclusive nature no doubt contributed to researchers’ inability to 
successfully collect and study a higher volume of specimens, the FWS 
was nevertheless sufficiently concerned to take action.17 Attributing the 
squirrel’s decline to the combined effects of habitat destruction, 
pathogens, exotic pests, acid rain, synergistic chemical effects, and the 
proliferation of competitors, the FWS ultimately decided to place the 
                                                                                                                      
11 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f) (2006); Friends of Blackwater, v. Salazar, 691 F.3d 428, 432–
52 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
12 See infra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 115–117 and accompanying text. 
14 Amber Shell Ward, Casenote, Strahan v. Linnon: A Missed Opportunity for Testing the Use 
of Section 7(A)(1) As an Action-Forcing Provision, 4 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 311, 330 (1999). 
15 See infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. 
16 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Appalachian Northern Flying Squirrels Recovery 
Plan Update 2 (2001), available at http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/recovery_plan/010906.pdf; 
see Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 430. 
17 See Determination of Endangered Status for Two Kinds of Northern Flying Squirrel, 60 
Fed. Reg. 26,999, 26,999 ( July 1, 1985) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Recovery Plan, supra 
note 3, at 11. 
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West Virginia northern flying squirrel on the endangered species list on 
July 1, 1985.18 
 In accordance with the mandates of section 4(f) of the ESA, the 
FWS formulated a recovery plan geared toward facilitating the “conser-
vation and survival” of the West Virginia northern flying squirrel.19 The 
resultant recovery plan included criteria that provided for both the 
down-listing and delisting of the species contingent upon a showing of 
satisfactory documentation.20 The first criteria required a finding of sta-
ble or expanding squirrel populations “in a minimum of 80% of all 
Geographic Recovery Areas [(GRA)] designated for the subspecies.”21 
Second, the plan necessitates an accumulation of sufficient ecological 
and timber management data “to assure future protection and man-
agement” of the species.22 The third recovery criterion calls for GRA 
management to ensure sufficient habitat capable of promoting both 
population expansion and habitat corridors for migration among 
GRAs.23 Finally, complete delisting would be possible after the FWS also 
demonstrated that the high altitude forests, essential to the squirrels’ 
survival, were not threatened by the introduction of pests or environ-
mental pollution.24 
 Nearly sixteen years later in 2002, the FWS hired a biologist to in-
vestigate and assess the species’ status.25 The following year the FWS 
began drafting a five-year review of the West Virginia northern flying 
squirrel, which was published in April 2006.26 In this review the FWS 
stated that previous threats to the squirrel had abated to the point that 
the species persisted throughout its current range.27 Furthermore, the 
FWS concluded that the criteria stipulated in the recovery plan in 1990 
no longer met current standards for adequacy and needed updating.28 
The review noted that scientists had successfully captured 1141 speci-
mens at 105 different sites, as compared to 10 captures at the original 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Determination of Endangered Status for Two Kinds of Northern Flying Squirrel, 
60 Fed. Reg. at 26,999; Recovery Plan, supra note 3, at 12–15. 
19 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 430. 
20 Recovery Plan, supra note 3, at 18. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 431. 
26 See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., West Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel 5-Year 
Review: Summary and Evaluation 2 (2006). 
27 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 431; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 26, at 2–3. 
28 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 26, at 4. 
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time of listing in 1985.29 The FWS thus recommended commencing the 
delisting process pursuant to its determination that the species per-
sisted throughout its historical range and no longer qualified as endan-
gered or threatened.30 
 On August 26, 2008 the FWS published its final rule, effective Sep-
tember 25, 2008, removing the West Virginia northern flying squirrel 
from the List of Threatened and Endangered Wildlife.31 The FWS justi-
fied its decision to delist, despite the fact that not all the recovery plan 
criteria had been met, on the grounds that the criteria were merely in-
tended to provide guidance.32 Moreover, the FWS contended that its 
decision was partly based on an analysis and satisfaction of the five 
threat factors outlined in section 4(a)(1) of the ESA.33 
 The agency’s final decision was the effective equivalent of its pro-
posed rule, which was previously met with considerable opposition—as 
evidenced by the volume of negative responses received during the 
mandatory notice and comment period.34 In response to commenters 
who objected to the FWS’s reliance on persistence data as an indicator 
of population health and stability, the FWS maintained that persistence 
was the best available indicator given the many obstacles impeding de-
tection of the species.35 The Friends of Blackwater, a nonprofit organi-
zation founded in 1987 for the purpose of assisting wildlife refuges in 
carrying out their public use missions, reacted by filing a suit in the 
D.C. Circuit.36 On March 25, 2011 the court ruled in favor of the plain-
tiffs, vacating the FWS’s delisting rule and consequently reinstating the 
federal protections in place prior to the effective date of delisting.37 
The district court found that removing the squirrel from the endan-
gered species list, despite the recovery plan criteria remaining out-
                                                                                                                      
29 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 431; U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 26, at 7. 
30 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 26, at 20. 
31 Final Rule Removing the Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel from the Federal List of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,226, 50,226 (Aug. 26, 2008) (codi-
fied 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 50,227. 
34 Id. The FWS received a total of 4808 comments, the majority of which were letters 
objecting to the delisting. Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Complaint, supra note 1, at 233; Friends of Blackwater, Fish & Wildife Serv., http:// 
www.fws.gov/blackwater/friends.html (last updated Apr. 26, 2011). 
37 Friends of Blackwater, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Reinstatement of Listing Protections for 
the Virginia Northern Flying Squirrel in Compliance with a Court Order, 76 Fed. Reg., 
35,349, 35,349 ( June 17, 2011) (to be codified 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
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standing, constituted a violation of the ESA.38 The FWS subsequently 
appealed the court’s decision on the grounds that it erred in finding 
the recovery plan criteria binding.39 
II. Legal Background 
 The Administrative Procedure Act governs the procedure and 
scope of judicial review of agency rulemaking.40 Under the APA, courts 
review the administrative record directly and have the power to hold as 
unlawful and set aside any agency action they deem “arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”41 Courts review agency statutory interpretation under a two-step 
framework first laid out in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.42 The initial inquiry considers whether Congress has spo-
ken unambiguously about the precise issue under consideration.43 If it 
has not, step two obligates the court to defer to the administering 
agency’s interpretation, provided that it reflects a reasonable construc-
tion of the statute.44 
 The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) vastly broadened the 
scope of the government’s management authority over endangered 
and threatened species on both public and private land.45 Congress en-
acted the ESA for the express purpose of conserving the ecosystems on 
which endangered and threatened species depend, and providing pro-
grams for the conservation of such species.46 Generally, the ESA seeks 
to achieve these goals by means of “a comprehensive set of affirmative 
mandates, stringent prohibitions, and limited exceptions.”47 
                                                                                                                      
38 See Friends of Blackwater, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 245. Instead of applying the precise crite-
ria set forth in the Recovery Plan, the FWS reached its delisting decision on the basis of an 
analysis of the five listing factors contained in § 1533(a)(1) of the ESA. Id. at 238-39; see 16 
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006). 
39 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 432. 
40 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
41 Id. § 706(2)(A); Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar, 691 F.3d, 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
42 See 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
43 Id. at 842. 
44 Id. at 842–43. 
45 Envtl. Law Inst., Overview and Structure of the ESA: Generally, 3 Law of 
Envtl. Prot. § 23:6 (2012). 
46 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006); see also Presidential Statement on Signing the Endangered 
Species Act of 1973, 10 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1 ( Jan. 7, 1974) (“Nothing is more price-
less and more worthy of preservation than the rich array of animal life with which our coun-
try has been blessed . . . and it forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as Americans.”). 
47 Envtl. Law Inst., supra note 45. 
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 The ESA charges the Secretary of the Interior with determining 
whether a species is endangered or threatened.48 The Act stipulates 
that the Secretary must consider five enumerated factors in the listing 
decision-making process.49 Furthermore, the Act instructs the Secretary 
to make listing determinations “solely on the basis of the best scientific 
and commercial data available to him after conducting a review of the 
status of the species.”50 
 In a major 1978 amendment to the ESA, Congress mandated that 
once a species is formally listed, the U.S Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) 
must develop and implement a recovery plan aimed at facilitating the 
species’ conservation and continued survival.51 In developing and im-
plementing a recovery plan the Secretary must, to the maximum extent 
practicable, incorporate “objective, measurable criteria which, when 
met, would result in a determination . . . that the species be removed 
from the list.”52 The objective, measurable criteria must directly address 
the threats that initially prompted the listing.53Section 4(f) carves out 
an exception to the recovery plan mandate, providing that the Secre-
tary need not develop or implement a recovery plan if such a plan 
would not promote conservation of the species.54 
 The vast majority of courts that have confronted the issue have de-
clined to render recovery plans legally enforceable.55 For instance, in 
                                                                                                                      
48 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2006). The Secretary delegated his responsibilities under 
the Act to the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS). Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 430 n*. 
Thus, the FWS and the Secretary are used interchangeability in this Comment. 
49 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). The five factors are: “(A) the present or threatened destruc-
tion, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commer-
cial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors 
affecting its continued existence.” Id. 
50 Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
51 An Act to Amend the Endangered Species Act of 1973 to Establish an Endangered 
Species Interagency Committee to Review Certain Actions to Determine Whether Exemp-
tions from Certain Requirements of That Act Should Be Granted for such Actions, Pub. L. 
No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, (1978) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2006)); Jason M. 
Patlis, Recovery, Conservation, and Survival Under the Endangered Species Act: Recovering Species, 
Conserving Resources, and Saving the Law, 17 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 55, 70 (1996). 
52 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii). 
53 See Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96, 111 (D.D.C. 1995). 
54 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). 
55 Federico Cheever, Recovery Planning: The Courts and the Endangered Species Act, Nat. Re-
sources & Env’t, Fall 2001, at 106, 108; see Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 
55, 69, 72 (2004); Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 548 (11th Cir. 1996); Strahan v. 
Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 591 (D. Mass. 1997); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 
408 (D.D.C. 1995); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 392 (D. Wyo. 
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1986 the D.C. Circuit found in National Audubon Society v. Hester that the 
FWS was justified in abandoning its recovery plan for the California 
condor.56 The FWS implemented a recovery plan calling for both ex-
tensive tracking efforts and a captive propagation program, in response 
to studies indicating that the condor population had been decimated 
to a mere twenty-six specimens.57 An alarming series of discoveries 
showing that the condors were even more imperiled than originally 
thought, however, caused the FWS to promptly abandon its recovery 
plan in favor of total captive propagation.58 After reviewing the district 
court’s decision, the D.C. Circuit found that the FWS’s failure to follow 
its recovery plan was legally permissible.59 The court reasoned that the 
FWS lawfully exercised its absolute discretion to alter the plan in re-
sponse to changing circumstances.60 
 Similar to the D.C. Circuit, other courts generally decline to treat 
recovery plans as legally binding.61 In 1996, in Fund for Animals, Inc. v. 
Rice, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found in favor of the defen-
dants in a suit filed by environmental groups seeking to prevent con-
struction of a municipal landfill on a wetlands site alleged to be the 
habitat of the endangered Florida Panther.62 The court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ claim that the FWS and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers vio-
lated the ESA by failing to implement the panther’s 1987 recovery plan, 
reasoning that that the practical effect of the plaintiffs’ position would 
be to mistakenly treat the recovery plan as a document carrying the 
force of law.63 Under the court’s interpretation, “recovery plans are for 
guidance purposes only.”64 As the court succinctly articulated, “[b]y 
providing general guidance as to what is required in a recovery plan, 
the ESA ‘breathe[s] discretion at every pore.’”65 
 In 1997, the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, grap-
pling with the same issue in Strahan v. Linnon, concluded that the 
“[c]ase law instructs that the defendants [were] correct in their asser-
                                                                                                                      
1987). But see Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *11 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 1, 1993) (declining to hold recovery plans unenforceable). 
56 801 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
57 Id. at 405–06. 
58 Id. at 406. 
59 Id. at 408. 
60 Id. 
61 Envtl. Law Inst., supra note 45, § 23:22. 
62 85 F.3d 535, 535, 548 (11th Cir. 1996). 
63 Id. at 547. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
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tion that the content of recovery plans is discretionary.”66 The court 
held that the National Marine Fisheries Service’s failure to adopt the 
exact measures provided for in its recovery plan for the Right whale did 
not render the plan deficient.67 In fact, the court reasoned that such 
agency decisions should be afforded significant deference, particularly 
in cases involving expert, scientific judgment.68 
 Similarly, ten years earlier, the District Court for the District of 
Wyoming similarly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the ESA obli-
gates the Secretary to strictly adhere to and abide by implemented re-
covery plans.69 In National Wildlife Federation v. National Park Service, the 
court upheld the National Park Service’s decision to keep open a Yel-
lowstone National Park campsite, despite the presence of threatened 
grizzly bear species.70 The court implicitly held that the Secretary 
could, in effect, selectively decide which provisions of the grizzly bear 
recovery plan to enforce.71 The court pointedly announced that it 
would “not attempt to second guess the Secretary’s motives for not fol-
lowing the recovery plan,” and in doing so affirmed the general pre-
sumption of secretarial discretion.72 
 In the broader context of environmental law, it is generally under-
stood that plans designed to protect the environment are implemented 
for guidance purposes only.73 In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alli-
ance, environmental groups sued the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) in response to a perceived failure to protect public lands from 
environmental damage caused by off-road vehicle use.74 In finding for 
                                                                                                                      
66 967 F. Supp. 581, 597 (D. Mass. 1997). 
67 Id. at 598. 
68 Id. 
69 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Wyo. 1987). 
70 Id. at 392. 
71 Id. at 388. 
72 Id.; but see Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *11 (W.D. Tex. 
Feb. 1, 1993) (restricting the NWF’s secretarial discretion). A rare outlier, in Sierra Club v. 
Lujan, the District Court for the Western District of Texas found that the provision permit-
ting temporary delay of recovery plan implementation does not grant the Secretary authority 
to do so indefinitely. 1993 WL, 151353 at *11; Eric Helmy, Comment, Teeth for a Paper Tiger: 
Redressing the Deficiencies of the Recovery Provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 30 Envtl. L. 843, 
855–56 (2000). 
73 See, e.g., Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 Tul. L. 
Rev. 265, 275–76, 283–85 (2009) (characterizing fishery management plans as largely discre-
tionary and Clean Air Act State Implementation plans as providing nonbinding guidance); 
George B. Wyeth, The “Regulation by Guidance” Debate: An Agency Perspective, 9 Nat. Resources 
& Env’t, Spring 1995, at 52, 53 (identifying Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act National Contingency Plans as providing nonbinding guidance). 
74 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004). 
38 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:E. Supp. 
the defendant, the Supreme Court held that the BLM’s land use plan 
did not have the force of law and was thus nonbinding.75 The Court 
explicitly stated that such plans are “‘designed to guide . . . future . . . 
actions,’” not compel them.76 
III. Analysis 
 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held in Friends of Black-
water v. Salazar that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service’s (FWS) reliance on 
persistence, as opposed to population data, did not render its delisting 
decision arbitrary and capricious.77 The court explained that in the ab-
sence of existing, reliable population-based data, the FWS was not obli-
gated to conduct an independent study, but rather was permitted to 
rely upon the best data available.78 The majority further determined 
that the FWS’s consideration of all five types of threats in the listing cri-
teria provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), as a whole, consti-
tuted a reasonable consideration of the adequacy of existing regulatory 
mechanisms.79 
 The most important issue before the court, however, concerned 
the legal enforceability of recovery plans.80 The D.C. Circuit held that 
the criteria in the recovery plan provision—unlike the enumerated fac-
tors in the listing criteria provision of the ESA—are nonbinding.81 The 
court rejected a Friends of Backwater argument that the Act’s statutory 
language evidences congressional intent that complete satisfaction of 
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. at 69, 72. 
76 Id. at 69 (quoting 43 C.F.R § 1601.0-2 (2003)). 
77 691 F.3d 428, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
78 Id. at 435 (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, 215 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). In Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt, the D.C. Circuit expounded upon 
the ESA’s best available data provision. 215 F.3d at 60. The court heard the issue of wheth-
er the FWS’s determination of the species’ listing status required the FWS to conduct on-
site specimen counts of the Queen Charlotte goshawk population. Id. at 59. The D.C. Cir-
cuit held that the district court was without authority to order the Secretary to conduct 
independent population counts. Id. at 60. The court explained that the best available data 
standard “merely prohibits the Secretary from disregarding available scientific evidence 
that is in some way better than the evidence he relies on.” Id. (quoting City of Las Vegas v. 
Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). 
79 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436 (noting the FWS was not required to consider the 
adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms in isolation); see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(2006). 
80 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 432. The court’s holding with respect to this issue 
also serves as the focal point of the foregoing analysis. As such, all ancillary issues and 
holdings fall outside the scope of this inquiry. 
81 Id. at 432, 436. 
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recovery plan criteria is a necessary precondition to delisting.82 Instead, 
the D.C. Circuit found that objective, measurable criteria “are predic-
tive of the [FWS’s] delisting analysis rather than controlling that analy-
sis.”83 The court reasoned that the recovery plan provision is devoid of 
language affirmatively mandating that the FWS consult the recovery 
plan criteria in making a delisting decision.84 Unlike the listing criteria 
provision, 4(a)(1), which explicitly demands that the secretary shall 
consider the five enumerated statutory factors prior to making a deci-
sion; the recovery plan provision, section 4(f) merely provides that the 
recovery plan criteria should be that “‘which when met would result in 
a determination . . . that the species be removed from the list.’”85 The 
majority explicated that this future conditional language expresses a 
sufficient, but not necessary, condition.86 The court therefore deemed 
the Act silent and ambiguous as to what happens when the criteria are 
not satisfied.87 
 The majority also repudiated the dissent’s contention that inter-
preting section 4(f) as nonbinding renders the recovery plan require-
ment superfluous.88 The court asserted to the contrary that the plan’s 
objective, measurable criteria, even if nonbinding, nevertheless pro-
vides a valuable gauge by which to evaluate the FWS’s progress toward 
the goal of species conservation.89 
 From the myopic perspective of proper statutory interpretation 
and precedential analysis—that is, irrespective of the resultant implica-
tions—the D.C. Circuit decided Friends of Blackwater correctly.90 The 
weight of the case law, both binding and persuasive, in conjunction 
with a coherent examination of the relevant statutory text, compels the 
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. at 437; see 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(B)(ii) (2006) (“The Secretary, in developing and 
implementing recovery plans, shall, to the maximum extent practicable--incorporate in 
each plan--objective measurable criteria which, when met, would result in a determination, 
in accordance with the provisions of this section, that the species be removed from the 
list.”). 
83 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 433. 
84 See id. at 432–33. 
85 Id. at 432–33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2006)). 
86 Id. at 437. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 434, id. at 445–46 (Rogers, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that under the 
majority’s interpretation, the FWS can proceed to delist a species pursuant to section 4(a) 
without regard to the requirements of sections 4(f)(1) and (4), thus rendering those sec-
tions meaningless. Id. at 446 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
89 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434 (majority opinion). 
90 Id. at 436 (finding that recovery plan criteria need not be satisfied before delisting); 
see, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 535, 547 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
recovery plans are nonbinding). 
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conclusion that recovery plans lack legal enforceability.91 The FWS was 
justified in abandoning the West Virginia northern flying squirrel’s re-
covery plan in the sequence of events leading up to Friends of Blackwa-
ter v. Salazar, like it was in jettisoning the California condor’s original 
recovery plan—in favor of increased protection—prior to National 
Audubon Society v. Hester.92 In both cases the FWS permissibly exercised 
its discretionary authority—granted by the ESA—in response to chang-
ing circumstances regarding the respective species’ statuses.93 As one 
commentator accurately noted in the wake of the National Audubon So-
ciety decision, “[b]y condoning an administrative action that contra-
vened a promulgated recovery plan, National Audubon Society granted 
the Secretary almost unlimited discretion with respect to recovery plan 
implementation.”94 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit’s proper application 
of binding precedent to analogous facts in Friends of Blackwater compels 
the conclusion that satisfaction of recovery plan criteria is discretion-
ary.95 
 Although not similarly bound by decisions of courts outside its ju-
risdiction, the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Friends of Blackwater nevertheless 
comports with the general consensus of other federal courts.96 The per-
suasive authority of decisions such as Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice in the 
Eleventh Circuit, Strahan v. Linnon in the District Court of Massachu-
setts, and National Wildlife Federation v. National Park Service in the Dis-
trict Court of Wyoming suggests that the D.C. Circuit correctly inter-
preted recovery plans as nonbinding.97 These decisions demonstrate 
                                                                                                                      
91 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hester, 801 F.2d 405, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (declaring 
recovery plans discretionary in nature); see also Envtl. Law Inst., supra note 45, § 23:22. 
92 Compare Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436 (upholding delisting despite the failure 
to satisfy all recovery plan criteria permissible), with Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 801 F.2d at 408 
(validating the legality of the FWS’s decision to take action not provided for in the recov-
ery plan). 
93 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 801 F.2d at 408. 
94 Helmy, supra note 72, at 854. 
95 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 801 F.2d at 408. These 
cases are factually analogous in the sense that the FWS, in both instances, abandoned the 
species’ original recovery plans on account of changing circumstances that rendered those 
plans deficient. Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 801 F.2d at 408. 
96 Compare Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436 (upholding the agency’s decision to 
abandon the West Virginia northern flying squirrel’s recovery plan on the grounds that 
such plans are nonbinding), with Fund for Animals, 85 F.3d at 547–48 (finding the agency’s 
decision not to implement the Florida Panther’s recovery plan justifiable because recovery 
plans lack the force of law); see also Envtl. Law Inst., supra note 45, § 23:22. 
97 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436; Fund for Animals, 85 F.3d at 547; Strahan v. 
Linnon, 967 F. Supp. 581, 597 (D. Mass. 1997); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 
F. Supp. 384, 388 (D. Wyo. 1987). 
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the tendency of courts to defer to agency judgment—a trend justified 
by the fact that agencies provide concentrated, professional expertise.98 
Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s deference to the FWS’s decision that the West 
Virginia northern squirrel no longer qualified as endangered, despite 
its failure to satisfy all recovery plan criteria, harmonizes with the Dis-
trict Court of Massachusetts’s acquiescence to expert, scientific judg-
ment and District Court of Wyoming’s unwillingness to second guess 
agency decision-making.99 This result moreover accords with step two of 
the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. analysis 
whereby a reviewing court defers to the agency’s interpretation pro-
vided that it reflects a “permissible construction of the statute.”100 
 The dissent ardently insisted that the majority’s interpretation has 
the practical consequence of rendering recovery plan criteria superflu-
ous.101 This argument appears compelling at first blush, especially in 
light of the Supreme Court’s decree that “‘[a] statute should be con-
strued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be 
inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’”102 The D.C. Circuit, 
however, assuages any such concern by explicating that recovery plan 
criteria, though nonbinding, is nevertheless critical to evaluating the 
FWS’s progress toward the ultimate goal of species conservation.103 In 
advancing this position, the court cited the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance and implicitly analogized the 
recovery plan provision, 4(f), of the ESA to the statutory provision, re-
quiring the BLM to promulgate land use plans.104 The court reasoned 
that section 4(f), like the relevant statute in the Supreme Court case, 
does not have binding legal effect.105 Thus, just as land use plans are 
tools by which to project present and future land use, recovery plans 
                                                                                                                      
98 See, e.g., Strahan, 967 F. Supp. at 598 (“Indeed, especially when expert, scientific 
judgements are involved, the court must afford the agency’s decision a great deal of defer-
ence.”); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 669 F. Supp. at 389 (“This court will not attempt to second 
guess the Secretary’s motives for not following the recovery plan.”); Alexander J. Cella 
et al., 40 Mass. Practice, Admin. Law & Practice § 1639 (2012). 
99 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 436; see Strahan, 968 F. Supp. at 598; Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 669 F. Supp. at 389. 
100 See 467 U.S. 827, 843 (1984). 
101 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 445 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
102 Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (quoting 2A Sutherland, Statutes And 
Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 181–86 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)). 
103 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. 
104 See 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004); Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. 
105 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. 
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comparably gauge and project progress toward species recovery.106 As 
one commentator similarly suggested, “[t]heir function is not to pro-
vide an enforceable ‘to do’ list binding federal agencies,” instead re-
covery plans “provide the lens through which federal agencies apply 
the general provisions of the law to the plight of specific species.”107 
Consequently, the court was logically justified in reaching its conclusion 
that “[a] plan is a statement of intention, not a contract.”108 
 Focusing exclusively on statutory construction, the portion of sec-
tion 4(f) providing for the implementation of objective, measurable 
recovery plan criteria “which, when met would result in a determina-
tion . . . that the species be removed from the list” is seemingly suscep-
tible to two—though not equally plausible—readings.109 The dissent’s 
interpretation of this language would impose a binding constraint 
upon the FWS’s delisting analysis.110 Although the dissent’s interpreta-
tion is reasonable, the majority’s interpretation of recovery plans as 
merely instructive must prevail in light of the directive that “courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says there.”111 In drafting this section, the leg-
islature chose the word would as opposed to will.112 As noted by the ma-
jority, this choice of future conditional tense has the effect of rendering 
satisfaction of the recovery plan criteria a sufficient, but not necessary 
precondition to delisting.113 Thus, the dissent’s interpretation is only 
                                                                                                                      
106 See Norton, 542 U.S. at 69; Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. The court noted the 
FWS “fairly analogizes a recovery plan to a map or a set of directions that provides objec-
tive and measurable steps to guide a traveler to his destination. . . . Although a map may 
help a traveller chart his course, it is the sign at the end of the road, here the five statutory 
factors indicating recovery . . . that tells him his journey is over.” Friends of Blackwater, 691 
F.3d at 434; see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 792 F. Supp. 834, 835 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(stating that recovery plans have never been action documents). The court further stated 
that “[the recovery plan] left open different approaches and contemplated that when an 
agency or group made specific proposals for achieving a particular objective of the plan, 
there would be a need for further study.” Id. 
107 See Cheever, supra note 55, at 135. 
108 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 434. 
109 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii) (2006); Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 433. 
110 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 442–43 (Rogers, J. dissenting). 
111 See; Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992); Friends of Blackwater, 
691 F.3d at 434. Additionally, the preceding qualifying phrase “to the maximum extent 
practicable” indicates nonbinding discretion. Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 433 (citing 
Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 146 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
112 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(B)(ii). 
113 Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 437. 
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tenable under a hypothetical reading that substitutes the word will in 
place of would.114 
 Although the D.C. Circuit correctly interpreted the ESA’s recovery 
plan criteria as nonbinding, this case nevertheless demonstrates that 
proper statutory construction does not always guarantee desirable re-
sults.115 Despite the soundness of the majority’s interpretation of the 
text’s plain meaning, concerning policy implications nevertheless 
abound.116 Most notably, that recovery plans lack the force of law signifi-
cantly hinders the efficacy of the ESA’s protection of endangered and 
threatened species.117 The holding of Friends of Blackwater specifically 
states that “the Secretary reasonably interpreted the Endangered Spe-
cies Act as not requiring that the criteria in a recovery plan be satisfied 
before a species may be delisted pursuant to the factors in the Act it-
self.”118 This holding, however, potentially has broader reach and can 
therefore be extended to apply in situations beyond the scope of this 
particular case.119 
 Thus, the recovery plan provision is but a paper tiger—lacking the 
necessary teeth of enforceability.120 If the legislature intended, contrary 
to what it actually articulated, that recovery plan criteria be legally bind-
ing, clarification by means of statutory amendment is a necessary re-
medial recourse.121 Other methods of redress, while plausible, merely 
circumvent the problematic statutory language.122 Legislative amend-
ment offers the distinct advantage of being the most direct means of 
redressing the current deficiency.123 The benefit of directness cannot 
be overstated within the context of a situation already plagued by crip-
pling uncertainty and ambiguity.124 
                                                                                                                      
114 See id. at 437, id. at 442–43 (Rogers, J. dissenting). Or, alternatively the dissent’s in-
terpretation is plausible if the qualifying word only is read into the statute “which, [only] 
when met, would result . . . .” Id. at 437 (majority opinion). 
115 See id. at 436, id. at 452 (Rogers, J. dissenting). 
116 See id. at 452 (Rogers, J. dissenting); Helmy, supra note 72, at 854; Philip Kline, Com-
ment, Grizzly Bear Blues: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act’s Delisting Process and Recovery 
Plan Requirements, 31 Envtl. L 371, 375 (2001). 
117 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 452 (Rogers, J. dissenting). 
118 Id. at 436 (majority opinion). 
119 See id. 
120 Helmy, supra note 72, at 845. 
121 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2006). 
122 Helmy, supra note 72, at 856–57, 858 (suggesting the promotion of recovery 
through separate provisions of the ESA). 
123 Id. at 856. 
124 See Friends of Blackwater, 691 F.3d at 433, 437. 
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Conclusion 
 It is undeniable that the Endangered Species Act has played an 
integral role in effecting the conservation and recovery of countless 
endangered and threatened species in the forty some-odd years since 
its enactment.125 This is not to say the Act cannot do better, however. 
Although most courts, including the D.C. Circuit, have correctly recog-
nized recovery plans as nonbinding guidance mechanisms, this inter-
pretation begs the critical question of whether guidance alone is 
enough. If the answer to this question is no, Congress must amend the 
text of section 4(f) of the ESA to impute the force of law on recovery 
plan criteria. Such an amendment is necessary on account of the stark 
reality that the collective fates of untold species, such as the West Vir-
ginia northern flying squirrel, lie in the balance. 
                                                                                                                      
125 Jason C. Rylander, Comment, Recovering Endangered Species in Difficult Times: Can the 
ESA Go Beyond Mere Salvage?, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10017, 10018 (2012). 
